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Abstract 
 
Organizations usually contract their software projects to avoid the risks associated with 
developing the software internally and to control their costs. However, a study of two-dozen 
contracted project indicates that such organizations face unique risks and hidden costs that are 
particular to software aquisitions.  This paper describes research done to estimate the effort 
expended by organizations in overseeing and participating in contracted software projects and the 
implications for predicting costs and identifying risks of such projects. It presents a framework for 
collecting and measuring costs incurred before, during and after the contract award. For many of 
the organizations that participated in the survey, realizing the actual costs and  risks of a project 
was an eye opener – hidden costs and risks  are significant and they are typically not managed.  
The research results emphasize  the need for institutionalizing processes for the collection of data 
about contracting costs within an organization so that databases of metrics about completed 
projects can be built and later used to forecast costs for future projects to improve decision-
making processes. The research results also emphasize the need to acknowledge the risks involved 
so  they can be mitigated to improve the relationship with the contracor and the chances for 
project success. The authors are engaged in research directed toward assisting such organizations 
in identifying the risks and costs and improving the acquisition process.    
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
n increasing number of organizations are contracting their software development projects to outside 
contractors predominantly to avoid the risk of failure due to continuously evolving technologies and lack of 
expertise in-house. This is particularly true for government agencies where technical salaries have not kept 
pace with salaries offered by business resulting in an inability to develop internal expertise. Studies show that 
between one fourth and one third of U.S. software projects involve outside contractors.  However, such an 
environment introduces additional cost factors and risks attributed to the interaction between the contractor and the 
customer.  The primary additional costs include the contracting organization personnel involved in planning, 
acquiring, and managing the project, and user involvement and participation.  
 
  If we look at software cost estimation processes, methods and tools in use, most estimate the cost of the 
technical and some management and support resources needed for a software project. What is missing in these tools 
and techniques are estimates of the contracting organization resources that are incurred before, during and after the 
contract award, in particular the user involvement dealing with the contractor during development processes. Such 
costs are considered hidden because they are incurred but not accounted for.  This paper addresses the need for 
improvements in existing software cost estimation processes by making the hidden costs of a contracting 
organization visible. The results of this research are significant to contracting organizations as they show that the 
hidden costs are incurred, are significant, but not managed. Failure to plan and schedule critical resources, such as 
user involvement, result in introducing risks to the project as these resources might not be available when needed. 
Incorporating the hidden costs into software economic analyses could improve the decisions making process.  
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email 
A 
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 The paper also describes some of the sources of risk to the customer and introduces three primary areas of 
risks: internally within the customer’s organization, externally within the contractor’s organization, and in the 
interfaces between the customer and the contractor.  
 
2.0  Background: Software Acquisition Process Improvement Efforts 
 
 Particularly significant to the study described in this paper is the set of CMM recommendations, developed 
by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University, and widely used in the USA. The CMM 
was developed in the late 80s as a result of the SEI being tasked by the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a 
means to evaluate the software development capability of its bidding contractors.  The processes recommended by 
the SEI in their Capability Maturity Model for Software development (CMM, CMM-I) [21,25] are now widely 
accepted as productive ways for organizations to achieve higher quality software than in the past.  A more recent 
focus of the SEI is on the processes involved in software acquisition. The experience of the Software Engineering 
Institute in developing the Capability Maturity Model for Software (SW-CMM) was directly applicable to 
developing the Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM). The SW-CMM describes the 
developer’s (contractor’s) role while the SA-CMM describes the buyer’s (acquirer’s) role in the software acquisition 
process. The same maturity paradigm used in the SW-CMM was used in building the SA-CMM. The SA-CMM 
addresses the functions that support the acquisition of software. The SA-CMM is designed to be generic enough for 
use by any government or industry organization, regardless of size, acquiring software. Organizations and 
individuals involved with outsourcing soon realized that customer involvement meant involvement in all stages of 
the SDLC if a reasonable product was the expectation. And, that involvement requires not only contract oversight, 
but also user, tester, inspector, and other kinds of participation. Few estimation methodologies take into account the 
cost to the contracting organization of this involvement or what form the involvement or cost estimation should take. 
 
 As with the CMM, the SEI sought to help contracting organizations by defining processes that could 
improve software acquisition by specifying the following maturity levels for the SA-CMM that characterize 
acquisition management: 
 
 Initial – The software acquisition process is characterized as ad hoc, and occasionally even chaotic. Few, if 
any, management controls are put in place. 
 Repeatable – Basic software acquisition project management processes are established to plan all aspects of 
the acquisition, manage software requirements, track project team and contractor team performance, 
manage the project’s cost and schedule baselines, evaluate the products and services, and successfully 
transition the software to the support organization. The project team is basically reacting to circumstances 
as they arise. 
 Defined – The acquisition organization’s software acquisition process is documented and standardized. All 
projects use an approved, tailored version of the organization’s standard software acquisition process for 
acquiring their software products and services. Project and contract management activities are proactive, 
attempting to anticipate and deal with acquisition circumstances before they arise. Risk management is 
integrated into all aspects of the project, and the organization provides training required by personnel 
involved in the acquisition. 
 Quantitative – Detailed measures of the software acquisition processes, products, and services are 
collected. The software processes, products, and services are quantitatively and qualitatively understood 
and controlled. 
 Optimizing – Continuous process improvement is empowered by quantitative feedback from the process 
and from piloting innovative ideas and technologies. Ultimately, an organization recognizes that continual 
improvement (and continual change) is necessary to survive. 
 
 In the survey that supports the authors’ research, it was evident that most organizations were not even 
aware of the SEI’s SA-CMM or SW-CMM. Few had formal, institutionalized acquisition planning and tracking 
processes for software; contractor selection processes (if formalized) tended to follow traditional selection processes 
for products and services; software requirements documents lacked precision and specificity; few projects had 
formalized acquisition project management, contract management, or configuration management plans for tracking 
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project activities and artifacts, overseeing internal and contractor personnel, evaluating progress and performance 
against requirements, or tracking costs; customer inspections of defined milestones were not part of the acquisition 
processes; risk identification and management processes were missing; and, data collection and archiving, if done at 
all, was the consequence of individual efforts rather than institutionalized requirements for software acquisition. 
Few projects involved post-mortems of the project’s lifecycle to improve processes in the future. 
 
3.0  Scope of Survey 
 
 In surveying companies about their contracted software project costs, a questionnaire was prepared and 
distributed. In some cases, the target-organization returned the completed survey. In others, face-to-face interviews 
were carried out using the questionnaire as an interview instrument. User's cost estimation processes were identified 
and examined, and later the users and management activities costs were measured for the surveyed projects. The 
respondents' organizations represented a broad range of companies and government agencies. The contracted 
projects costs studied ranged from $30K to $50M. Cost estimation methods varied widely ranging from "No 
estimation method" to the use of "Lines of Code." The most common project estimation technique was 
"Experience."  Regardless of the estimating technique used, 61 % of the projects had cost  over-runs and 50% had 
schedule over-runs.  The survey was designed to examine the contracting organizations cost estimation processes, to 
determine the magnitude of the hidden cost and the impact of not managing the hidden costs including the risks to 
the organizations.  The focus of the study was to determine: 
 
 The cost incurred by the procuring organization for resources needed before and during the system 
development lifecycle to acquire, manage, coordinate, control and support the software project. 
 The effort expended by management, users, support and other personnel with the required skills and 
expertise, and hardware and software tools required to support such efforts. 
 The cost of management of the contract, the contractor, the users and the quality of the product for the 
duration of the project. 
 The involvement of the users, user management and the user functional experts who have to participate in 
most activities in the development life cycle including requirement definition, product reviews, document 
reviews, and testing activities throughout the lifecycle. 
 The cost of quality assurance activities by quality assurance personnel. 
 The cost of software tools, hardware tools, travel expenses, user training, acceptance testing, management 
of deliverables, and management of the user and other support and miscellaneous expense items in support 
of the various activities. 
 
Results related to the Contracting Organization Cost Estimation Processes and Practices 
 
 The results of the survey showed that: 
 
 The majority (88%) of procuring organizations in the sample did not estimate their resources on completed 
projects.  
 The majority (65%) did not have formal processes to estimate, plan and schedule such resources.  
 The management resources, which are critical for project oversight, are more likely than other resources to 
be planned by organizations, but still are not planned by 69% of organizations. 
 The user resources, whose involvement in projects is critical, are not planned by 92% of organizations.  
 The cost of such resources is not included in any economic analysis or feasibility study of the project by 
57% of the organizations surveyed. 
 The collection of historical data on resources involved in completed projects is not done by 62% of 
organizations. 
  
  The lack of formal processes for planning resources introduces risks to the project as some of the critical 
resources are not committed formally and might not be available when needed, in particular those of management 
and the users. Jones [17]. 
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 The conclusion is that estimating the hidden cost of a contracting for over fifty percent of the organizations 
is an ad-hoc process, usually an indication of a low maturity level. 
 
 The survey tried to identify the source of funding of resources such as management, users, and others (other 
than contractors) working on software development projects and whether the cost of such resources are included in 
the final project cost. 
 The results indicated that the funding of resources, such as a project manager or a user, does not come from 
a project’s budget. Since such costs are incurred but not tracked or included in the final project cost, they are 
considered hidden.  This also means that the contracted price of a software development project does not reflect the 
actual cost. In addition there is likely to be a lack of commitment of resources whose functions may be critical for 
project success, Jones [18], and therefore risks are introduced. 
 
5.0   Results of the Measurement of the Additional /Hidden Cost  
 
 The findings from this part of the study exceeded the expectations of what the value of the hidden costs 
might be.  Initially, it was estimated to be about fifteen percent of the project development cost. The study showed 
that the hidden costs are quite substantial, the mean value being 190 % of the total development cost of the system, 
almost twice as much as the contract cost.  The value of the hidden cost is significant enough to motivate 
organizations to have formal procedures to account for it and include it in project plans. The value of the hidden cost 
must also be included in estimation models used for economic analysis of software projects and must be taken into 
account in the decision-making processes when assessing feasibility of a project.  
 
 The attribution of percentages of hidden costs to phase distribution in Table1 shows that analysis and 
implementation constitute the largest percentages followed by the design and testing phases. 
 
Studies show that analysis is considered one of 
the most risk prone activities of a system’s 
SDLC, an activity in which the user is heavily 
involved. The role of the user is also important 
during the testing of the software product for 
acceptance and when the product is deployed. 
 
 The results of the distribution of the 
hidden cost by labor categories in Table 2 show 
that the users and project management resources 
are the most significant.  
 
 This result is important in the sense that 
it draws attention to the necessity to plan and 
schedule the procuring organization’s resources.  
The distribution of the hidden costs by labor 
category and by phase draws attention to the 
various needed resources and when they should 
be planned and scheduled during the various 
phases of the software project along with their 
proportions. The results of the study concerning 
the user and management resources needed on a 
software project complements and supports results of other studies.  For example, a recurring theme in risk studies, 
such as the one by Statz and Tennisson [26], is that user participation, customer and user interaction, and user 
resource allocation, are sources of risks that need to be assessed and managed.  Also, risk studies by Jones [18] point 
to the importance of project management activities. Project management is considered by Jones [17] to be one of the 
key factors for the success of systems.  The general conclusions that we can make based on these results of the study 
TABLE 1: Phase Distribution of the Hidden Cost 
 
Phase Percent of Hidden Cost 
Acquisition 7.1 
Analysis 18.9 
Design 14.2 
Programming 5.6 
Testing 18.4 
Implementation 18.9 
Training 8.5 
Other 8.4 
 
TABLE 2: Distribution of the Hidden Cost by Labor Category 
 
Labor Category Percent of the Hidden Cost 
for the Labor Category 
Project Management 34 
User 48 
Quality Assurance 6 
Consultants 6 
Others 6 
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is that the hidden costs are substantial, and the needed resources must be planned, scheduled and better managed 
during the points in the lifecycle when their participation is critical. 
 
In addition, the study showed a very strong relationship between the project size and the hidden cost 
expressed in man-months. For the 26 projects studied, the influence of project size (removing outliers) was found to 
be linear and can be expressed as: 
 
M = 2.2 * KLOC + 52 
 
Where M is hidden cost in person-months and KLOC are thousands of lines of code. It should be noted that different 
projects recorded data about project size primarily as function points or lines of code. The relationship was made 
uniform for KLOC using widely accepted ratios that are dependent upon the development language/system used to 
produce the project. 
 
 For many of the organizations that participated in the survey, realizing the actual cost of a project was an 
eye opener -- hidden costs are incurred, the costs are significant, and are typically not managed. Organizations that 
understand inherent costs of contracting software are better positioned to estimate costs of future projects and also 
improve decision-making processes associated with software contract oversight 
 
5.0  Risk Identification and Management in Software Acquisition 
 
 In addition to identifying the hidden costs, the customer’s assessment and management of risks associated 
with projects is equally important.  At a minimum, failure to plan and schedule critical resources such as users, 
project managers, domain experts, management software, and others may pose a risk to a contracting organization 
and to the project itself. Some risks have significant side effects that impact on other projects within the customer’s 
organization. Some risks are magnified by sub-contracting relationships. This phase of the research explores the 
risks associated with sub-contracting with the expectation that recommendations can be devised that will help 
minimize those risks or at least help organizations design mitigation plans. 
 
 What are some of the sources of risk to the customer? Risks are introduced in three primary areas: 
internally within the customer’s organization, externally within the contractor’s organization, and in the interfaces 
between the customer and the contractor. Some conditions that might be defined as potential risks from any of the 
three sources are not really risks in that there is a certainty of their occurrence but they are typically not identified by 
the customer or the contractor and they translate directly into cost or schedule overruns, in degradation of the 
customer-contractor relationship, or reduction in software quality. 
 
 The following is a list of risks in the three primary areas. Mitigation plans for these risks are left 
unspecified since they also vary between projects and organizations: 
 
5.1  Customer Internal Risk Sources 
 
 Inaccurate Estimations: Customers, even those who use estimation tools, can be characterized as “gutless” 
estimators of time, cost, and effort needed to produce software. Published software metrics uniformly 
support that real effort normally exceeds  
 Personnel: Unique knowledge, training and skills are needed to successfully launch, monitor, and bring to 
successful completion a software project that is contracted. Few organizations have enough personnel who 
are trained and capable in the processes involved in software acquisition. 
 Users: The greatest risk in this category is the availability and knowledge of future system users at the 
customer’s site. Frequently overlooked is the consumption of user time on a project that interferes with the 
user’s normal work. 
 User Requirements: Customers frequently fail to understand, precisely articulate, or fully specify their 
software requirements. 
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 Contract Specificity: Related to specification of user requirements, but broader in scope, is the specification 
of not only software requirements but also processes to be used between the customer and the contractor 
and the details of the interfaces between the two. 
 Creeping Requirements: Also related to specification of user requirements and contact specificity is the 
problem of requirements that change or expand. This characteristic of software projects has been 
exacerbated by web applications where changes to interfaces usually imply underlying changes in 
functionality. 
 Unanticipated Coordination Efforts: Management of a contracted software project, if it is to be successful, 
requires a great deal of interfacing between customer and contractor during the entire life-cycle of the 
project. Few contracting organizations anticipate the rigor demanded in coordination and oversight. 
  
5.2  Contractor Internal Risk Sources 
 
 Like the availability to the customer of the SEI’s SA-CMM, software contractors have the SEI’s 
CMM/CMMI [6, 20, 24] recommendations to adhere to and enable their organization to position itself to 
successfully complete high quality software projects. We include the contractor subsection here for completeness 
but intentionally ignore it, concentrating instead on the interfaces between the contractor and the customer that pose 
risks.  
 
5.3  Risk Sources in the Customer/Contractor Interfaces 
 The interfaces between the customer and the software contractor are the source of many risks that are 
typically not acknowledged and therefore not managed or mitigated. In the ideal world, customer and contractor 
would share processes and tools, their activities would be synchronized, and oversight would be welcomed. 
However, the number of failed contracted projects is testimony to the problems that arise in the relationship between 
the customer and contractor. Like the list in the previous section, the following list is intentionally not prioritized 
since, depending on the project and the organizations involved, the severity varies among projects and organizations. 
In addition, contracts where software components are sub-contracted and must ultimately be integrated pose 
additional risks and risk complications. The following is an abbreviated list of potential risks between customer and 
contractor. 
 
 Mutually Accepted Ambiguous Contract: In this case, both the customer and the contractor are willing to 
sign a contract that is not precise in the specification of the work to be done. 
 Ill-defined Interfaces: The parties do no specify the personnel interfaces for work coordination, nor do they 
specify the formal processes for customer-contractor interaction.  
 Multiple Contacts: This is related to the previous item and involves interaction of multiple personnel on 
both sides. Audit trails are lost, multiple conflicting approvals may be given, and procedures, if any, are 
side stepped.  
 Antagonistic Interfaces: Over time and during stress, customer-contractor interfaces can suffer because of 
failed performance (perceived or real) on either side. 
 Deficient Inspections: Work inspections are central to the success of a contracted project. When inspections 
(assuming they are scheduled) are ignored, postponed, poorly structured, or ineffectual, trust suffers. 
 Loosely Defined Checkpoints: When a mutually agreed upon project management plan is absent or 
deficient, agreement on acceptable checkpoints may be a source of contention. 
 Testing Criteria, Processes and Data: Frequently overlooked by the customer is the necessity to provide 
application data in a format, and in a timely manner, so that can be used in the contractor’s testing 
processes.  
 Shared Repositories: The existence of shared repositories of life-cycle artifacts bodes well for a project. 
However, ownership and controls can be a source of problems between the customer and contractor. 
 Configuration Management: Related to the previous item, configuration management controls may be the 
source of problems about shared documents and even deployed systems.  
 Risk Management Program: Negotiating agreement on a risk management plan is difficult. The contractor 
may be resentful of intrusive processes and the customer may be suspicious of opaque contractor processes.  
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 Quality Assurance Program: When the customer has more stringent QA processes than the contractor (or 
vice versa), quality inspections are likely to be antagonistic. 
 Potential for Re-use and Maintainability: Customers have fewer opportunities for controlling re-use 
potential unless processes are in place to insure re-use. Control over design approaches for ease of 
maintenance also presents a risk. 
 Missed Schedules: With a well-developed project management plan with high task granularity, the 
contractor’s schedules may be fully defined and oversight straightforward. However, frequently overlooked 
is the responsibility of the customer to provide contract backup in any number of ways. The customer’s 
tasks, too, need to be supported by a thorough (synchronized) project management plan. 
 Cost of Tools: System development, project planning, project management, oversight, documentation, and 
all of the other phases of the systems development life cycle require automated tools for building 
repositories of project artifacts. 
 Incompatible Deployment Infrastructures: Insuring that the development architecture is compatible with the 
deployment architecture is an often overlooked aspect of a contracting arrangement, a source of added 
costs, and a source of contention.  
 Security: Breach potential within the system architecture poses short and long term risks and data used for 
testing or benchmarking presents potential security vulnerability. 
 Transient Contract and Customer Personnel: Employees change jobs or are moved within organizations. 
 Unanticipated Direct Costs: Travel, on-site/off-site space requirements, audit requirements, user testing 
costs, meetings, use of external “overseers”, materials and equipment. 
 
6.0  Benefits In Managing The Hidden Cost And Identifying Risks 
 
 During the data collection phase of the authors’ research, many top managers of organizations who were 
participating in the survey demonstrated and aroused interest in the study and the anticipated findings. As they 
completed the survey, they became conscious of the magnitude of the hidden cost that they typically overlooked. 
Their interest can also be attributed to the following benefits that they can achieve in estimating hidden costs: 
 
 Including the hidden cost in strategic decisions made by executive management can improve the accuracy 
of estimates and the decision making process before undertaking a software project. A decision is usually 
based on an economic analysis, which requires an estimate of the money, resources, and time required to 
complete the project.  By including the hidden cost in cost benefit analysis, breakeven analysis or make-
buy decisions, managers can improve the accuracy of their estimates and confidence in their subsequent 
decisions. 
 Using the estimates of the hidden cost in project management to plan, monitor and control the development 
of a project can improve the management process. Good planning and effective control require an estimate 
of the activities required to complete a project, and the resources required for each activity for monitoring 
progress.  
 The costs estimates can also be used for the allocations of adequate funds for projects over time. The 
relationship between cost estimation and controlling projects are detailed further in DeMarco [8].   
 Using the estimates of the hidden cost in work breakdown structure to allocate resources and establish their 
commitments.  
 Planning for hidden costs can result in improved relations and communications between the procuring 
organization and the contractor by allocating the needed user and management resources in a timely 
manner.  For members of a project team to work together more efficiently on a project, it is necessary that 
each member understand his/her role in the project and the overall activities of the project.  
 Including the critical resources in the risk prone activities can result in improved risk management. 
 Improve the chances for successful software projects: Estimating and providing the necessary resources for 
a software project may help in avoiding the negative impacts identified in the findings and may improve the 
chances for developing better quality systems; systems within budget, on schedule, that meet the user 
requirements.  
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7.0  Conclusions 
 
     A formal, institutionalized, software acquisition project management process model will require that the 
organization plan all aspects of the acquisition, manage software requirements, track project team and contractor 
team performance, manage the project’s cost and schedule baselines, evaluate the products and services, and 
successfully transition the software to its support organization.  Especially critical to the success of a contracted 
project is the understanding of how to identify and manage risks.  The cost and risk impacts of not improving 
software acquisition processes are substantial.   
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